"Buick's Biggest Sales Flop: The 1986-88 Riviera was a handsome design, but missed the mark."

[Hazdaz]

 

Interesting video for a car that I personally was not too familiar with.  Remember seeing these growing up, but I never considered these all that special.  I can appreciate them a little more now that I am older, but I still see most late 70s, 80s and early 90s GM vehicles as missed opportunities - cars that could have been special but missed the mark because of incompetent executives that destroyed the company. 

 

[Barney Eaton]

Interesting video and a very good looking Riviera.     Also interesting it was called a sales flop when the author could have 

done a similar video on the Reatta which sold less vehicles in 4 production years than Riviera did in 1986 alone. 

1986 Riviera = 22,138

1987 Riviera = 15,223

1988 Riviera =  8,625

 

1988 - 1991 total Reatta production  21.751

[dship]

The '89-'93 Riviera, with its slant-back rear end design truly made it a better-looking Riviera...IMO.  At one point I owned two '92 Rivieras; a Midnight Blue Metallic with a dark blue landau roof and a Ruby Red Metallic with a white landau roof and white interior.

[Pat Curran]

Not sure of the production numbers but the Buick Somerset (not to be confused with the Regal Somerset)is a forgotten model.  They changed the name to Skylark but that didn’t seem to help.  

[rocketraider]

I'm convinced that's what hurt sales of the 86-89 E triplets. They looked too much like the downmarket N cars- Somerset, Calais and Grand Am.

 

Another classic example of a company listening to consultants instead of customers. I've read that the 86-89 E car sales were off 75% compared to the 1985s.

[RivNut]

With over 65,000 sold in 1985 alone, along with similar figures for the 79 - 84 models, you’d think that Buick would have a little more foresight into what the public liked.  Sales in 86 dropped to 22k and continued on a downward spiral through 1993 when only 4K were sold when production was halted in December 1992 and new tooling for the 1995 began.  

[RivNut]

Duh! Duplicate post. No delete feature. 

Edited November 15, 2023 by RivNut (see edit history)

[Hazdaz]

1 hour ago, rocketraider said:

classic example of a company listening to consultants instead of customers.

Isn't that the truth!  So many lost opportunities during the Malaise Era, but pinching pennies or listening to out-of-touch consultants ruined them. 

[NTX5467]

The OTHER issue with those Rivs is that the dealers probably didn't know "how" to order them and "how" to best sell them.  The pictured car is pretty advanced for back then.  I liked the push button switches, which were also similar to the N-cars, but they did tend to cause more problems than the earlier style of switches, as I recall.

 

Composite headlights were still new, back then, and probably cost more to do.  As things have transpired, I'd much rather have individual sealed beams than composite headlights in the current timeframe.  NO need to refinish them due to age deterioration of the clear lens and easier to replace.  PLUS probably costing less to produce, although there were more parts involved.  Therefore, considering all of the new stuff on those Rivs, the headlights were probably "cost savers" in the grand scheme of things.

 

One other item I recall is the Rivs had a plastic-filmed inside surface on the windshield.  Common razor blades could not be used to scrape inspection stickers and such from their surface without damaging it.  SO, "plastic razor blades" were sent to the dealers for such activities.  The film was there for occupant protection in the case of an accident, IIRC.

 

Chassis tuning was another area that GM was struggling with.  All of the cars had struts by that point in time, which did not ride as smooth as the prior suspension systems did, nor were as "sound isolated" from the occupants.  Buick opted for the softer side of things, as a harkening to the earlier orientations of smoothness.  Possibly a mistake, too.  I rented a fwd LeSabre for a weekend excursion and was appalled at how little control the struts had, as they were just too soft.  With the cruise set at 70mph, some imperceptible dips in the Interstate roadway would use ALL of the available travel, up and down, before the car finally settled back to level.  This surprised me, but when I saw a first-gen C-car on the access road, doing the same thing, I just shook my head "What were they trying to do?"

 

I think that Buick felt they were in trouble on many levels, back then.  Trying to be a technology leader was not working, especially combined with corporate production cost goals.  Going a step higher with voice command controls, as many cars also now have, might have made things better for the Graphic Display Center.

 

Another item about that GDC, by pushing two buttons at once, for a few seconds, would put the screen into vehicle diagnostic mode.  Which would allow techs to fully diagnose many things from the driver's seat.  Cadillac, I believe, had this capability too.  Kind of like an on-board scanner of sorts.  Unfortunately, those things vanished after this platform of E-body ended.

 

The issue with the mass air flow sensors seemed to vanish after this platform was replaced, too.  Buick was adamant, in their TSBs, that ONLY GM-supplied MAFs be used as some aftermarket brands had poor solder joints in their circuit boards and poor quality control.  All valid points, very possibly.  I figured, later, that it had to do with the GM suppliers as GM was obviously seeking lower pricing from them.  Each of the three model years had different MAFs.

 

At the corporate levels, there was a good bit of "group think" in the board rooms.  A corporate big wig got "some" idea and the underlings found ways to support those things, rather than "discuss" them with facts, by observation.  Not just at GM, but elsewhere, too.  Many opportunities were missed as people seeming didn't dare "dream big" and head in that direction.  Unfortunately, IF they might, it was "the wrong dream", following the status quo generally was followed, which had its own pitfalls.

 

Obviously having a "little brother" N-car look substantially the same was NOT a family tie that worked, especially when the introduction sequence was "backward".  Which further accentuated the apparently "no internal conversations" orientation I observed from GM at the time.  Another reason they had issues, by observation.  Which also tended to be the result of some internal actions which eventually led to Oldsmobile being deleted unnecessarily.

 

An observed issue was that GM had TWO fwd platforms with wheelbases only about ONE inch different.  The X-car was shorter and the N-car was longer.  Which also generated different divisional differences, too.  IF GM had combined them into one platform, with completely different outer skins, they would have saved more money than they suspected.

 

Engineers doing their best to advance their craft, as stylists tried to maintain expected styling cues and orientations while also moving things forward, with some "new marketing orientations" based on vehicle price points rather than customer demographics, all conspired to make GM what it was in the middle 1980s era, in the smaller platforms.  It took quite a many years for GM to learn how to build unibodies which were quiet and smooth, by observation.  At a time when corporate funding was thin, in retrospect.

 

Just some recollections,

NTX5467

[XframeFX]

It was quite a transition time back then. Never mind technical features or even styling. Car manufacturers were definitely struggling especially in marketing. It didn't help that GM was somewhat of a dictatorship to their Sales network and Customers. It seemed GM didn't care if they had your business or not!

 

All through the 80s I was single and $$$ were burning a hole in my pocket. In my circle we all agreed there wasn't a new car worth purchasing. We learned that blue 350 TargetMaster crate engine production was switching to Mexico identified in black. I always wanted to build a SBC with part numbers from my Chev Hi Perf book. So we all searched for existing blue 350 TargetMaster stock from sleepy dealer parts dept. in around 1981. This would be my 2-in-1 solution, a hi perf SBC (long block knocked down for better parts) and NEW, almost a new car.

 

Fast forward to 1986, I just missed the build-out date to order my 1st new car being constantly out of town. It was to be a 1986 Grand National. Oh well, maybe 1987 will have composite headlights and IRS, wishful thinking.

Sept 1986, I placed a deposit for that Turbo Regal, lots of OT paychecks in those years. In the ensuing months, many visits back to what was a crooked dealer. I'd walk past new Somersets and a Riviera in the showroom and glad I had that RWD Turbo Regal coming. My opinion at the time, the RWD Regal or full size Buicks were the only models for serious consideration.

My build never materialized! After the NY, the dealer called saying they cut me a check to refund my deposit. When I arrived, one hand produced that check and the other was an in-transit sheet for a Turbo T-Type Regal for $5K over List. Less options and not even a Grand National! I stormed out with them laughing when I asked how about a Regal GNX then? This while while passing cars in the showroom that would never appeal to me.

Complaints to GM of Canada produced nothing.

In the Fall of 1987 when FWD 1988 Regals were arriving that dealer called saying GM was going into extended production because of outraged Customers as if it wasn't his fault! Only 3 pre-packaged versions and a couple of options to add to each one. "Fine" I said but no deposit. If it shows up, I'll consider it, if it doesn't, that's OK too. In reality, didn't want to buy from them after laughing at me and I know it must have been difficult for him to call!

My extended production 1987 Grand National arrived days before Christmas and that Dealer continued to treat me like a one time Customer. It was a tense encounter for me while I tried to remain composed during the Sale.

 

Believe it or not, I returned to purchase another vehicle from that same Dealer years later on my wife's urging with kids clinging to my knees. Again they attempted to take advantage of us with red faces. But that's another story.

 

That '87 Grand National is long gone, but I still have that old school 350 TargetMaster!😃

 

[Hazdaz]

16 hours ago, NTX5467 said:

The OTHER issue with those Rivs is that the dealers probably didn't know "how" to order them and "how" to best sell them.  The pictured car is pretty advanced for back then.  I liked the push button switches, which were also similar to the N-cars, but they did tend to cause more problems than the earlier style of switches, as I recall.

 

Composite headlights were still new, back then, and probably cost more to do.  As things have transpired, I'd much rather have individual sealed beams than composite headlights in the current timeframe.  NO need to refinish them due to age deterioration of the clear lens and easier to replace.  PLUS probably costing less to produce, although there were more parts involved.  Therefore, considering all of the new stuff on those Rivs, the headlights were probably "cost savers" in the grand scheme of things.

 

One other item I recall is the Rivs had a plastic-filmed inside surface on the windshield.  Common razor blades could not be used to scrape inspection stickers and such from their surface without damaging it.  SO, "plastic razor blades" were sent to the dealers for such activities.  The film was there for occupant protection in the case of an accident, IIRC.

 

Chassis tuning was another area that GM was struggling with.  All of the cars had struts by that point in time, which did not ride as smooth as the prior suspension systems did, nor were as "sound isolated" from the occupants.  Buick opted for the softer side of things, as a harkening to the earlier orientations of smoothness.  Possibly a mistake, too.  I rented a fwd LeSabre for a weekend excursion and was appalled at how little control the struts had, as they were just too soft.  With the cruise set at 70mph, some imperceptible dips in the Interstate roadway would use ALL of the available travel, up and down, before the car finally settled back to level.  This surprised me, but when I saw a first-gen C-car on the access road, doing the same thing, I just shook my head "What were they trying to do?"

 

I think that Buick felt they were in trouble on many levels, back then.  Trying to be a technology leader was not working, especially combined with corporate production cost goals.  Going a step higher with voice command controls, as many cars also now have, might have made things better for the Graphic Display Center.

 

Another item about that GDC, by pushing two buttons at once, for a few seconds, would put the screen into vehicle diagnostic mode.  Which would allow techs to fully diagnose many things from the driver's seat.  Cadillac, I believe, had this capability too.  Kind of like an on-board scanner of sorts.  Unfortunately, those things vanished after this platform of E-body ended.

 

The issue with the mass air flow sensors seemed to vanish after this platform was replaced, too.  Buick was adamant, in their TSBs, that ONLY GM-supplied MAFs be used as some aftermarket brands had poor solder joints in their circuit boards and poor quality control.  All valid points, very possibly.  I figured, later, that it had to do with the GM suppliers as GM was obviously seeking lower pricing from them.  Each of the three model years had different MAFs.

 

At the corporate levels, there was a good bit of "group think" in the board rooms.  A corporate big wig got "some" idea and the underlings found ways to support those things, rather than "discuss" them with facts, by observation.  Not just at GM, but elsewhere, too.  Many opportunities were missed as people seeming didn't dare "dream big" and head in that direction.  Unfortunately, IF they might, it was "the wrong dream", following the status quo generally was followed, which had its own pitfalls.

 

Obviously having a "little brother" N-car look substantially the same was NOT a family tie that worked, especially when the introduction sequence was "backward".  Which further accentuated the apparently "no internal conversations" orientation I observed from GM at the time.  Another reason they had issues, by observation.  Which also tended to be the result of some internal actions which eventually led to Oldsmobile being deleted unnecessarily.

 

An observed issue was that GM had TWO fwd platforms with wheelbases only about ONE inch different.  The X-car was shorter and the N-car was longer.  Which also generated different divisional differences, too.  IF GM had combined them into one platform, with completely different outer skins, they would have saved more money than they suspected.

 

Engineers doing their best to advance their craft, as stylists tried to maintain expected styling cues and orientations while also moving things forward, with some "new marketing orientations" based on vehicle price points rather than customer demographics, all conspired to make GM what it was in the middle 1980s era, in the smaller platforms.  It took quite a many years for GM to learn how to build unibodies which were quiet and smooth, by observation.  At a time when corporate funding was thin, in retrospect.

 

Just some recollections,

NTX5467

Some of these same topics are discussed in an interview with Bob Lutz on the same channel as the video I posted above.  Bob has always been a straight-shooter and describes a lot of the internal struggles in trying to fix things at GM (and the other Detroit carmakers) in that era.

[NTX5467]

I like Lutz.  An interesting person.  But there's the better part of one chapter in his book "GUTS" which details why it seems that bartenders couldn't build him a Martini to his specs.  At the time, he was a visonary, an opportunist, and knew the financials had to work.  Many of his financial orientations, while at Chrysler, led to them suddenly printing money for themselves and the dealers.  The "golden eggs" which Daimler (unadmittedly) lusted after and then stole (as Daimler was in financial trouble in those years, partly through their own fault) through "management fees" or similar.  

 

During his time at Chrysler, Chrysler had attracted a LOT of younger talent.  Many of them followed him to GM and went on to be high-level managers for GM and helped build its successes in the 1990s.  Others went to Ford.  The younger people who replaced them at Chrysler were ALSO some exceptionally talented people, too.  And the ones after them, too.  Then came "The Daimler Years" and a lot was lost.  

 

As things evolved, Daimler first considered Chrysler to be "the weaker side" of the "Merger of Equals", as they were the dominant force on the Chrysler Board of Directors.  Slowly, all of the people who made Chrysler great were forced out for one reason or another.  Dr. Z and Dieter were sent to look after things over here.  Dieter had been involved with the Mercedes "hot rod" section.  Eventually, they became "The Kids in the Candy Store" after they discovered Chrysler successful performance car operations (which NEVER died during the recession and high (at the time) gas prices.  Even they small FWD cars had performance versions, as Ford and GM abandoned such, IF they ever had any at all.  Reports surfaced that they also ate lunch in the normal employee lunch area, which was earth-shattering for such to happen.  Then Dieter drove the Viper-powered motorcycle onto the stage at some big-time vehicle showing, against Daimler orders.

 

When I heard of the "merger", I knew that IF the Daimler operatives would "put their Teutonic Pride in their pockets, they might learn something" (MY words).  AND as it evolved, what started as the Daimlerization of Chrysler became The Chryslerization of Daimler!  Dr. Z returned to Germany to run Mercedes and took with him a Chrysler 300 SRT8 for his company car.  Which generated a Chrysler TSB on reprogramming the ECM to allow the cruise control to work at WOT cruise.

 

By observation, when Chrysler and Ford do "retro", it works for them.  When GM tries it, something gets lost in the mix or they try to take it into a dead-end direction.  Mustangs and Challengers sold well, as the Camaro ended up floundering and being discontinued again.  The first discontinuation of Camaro was the result of a squabble between GM and the UAW, for some small reason.  It became obvioius that GM was letting the Camaro get stale in the later 1990s (probably some 14th floor decision and orientation), which decreased sales, which then gave them the reason to kill it.  What happened after that "awakened" GM management who seemingly were willing to write-off the legions of Camaro enthusiasts.  A lesson Ford learned when what became the Ford Probe was almost a Mexican-built "New Mustang".  Ford listened and kept on going, but GM had already made a contractual agreement with the UAW to close soem plants (of which the Camaro/Firebird was one), so they had to kill the car for a while.  A bad move, by observation.

 

When Ford discontinued the mid-size T-bird, plus the similar Lincoln Mark and Mercury Cougar, it was because the platform and tooling was worn out and they did not see promise in doing new versions.  As great as that platform initially was, getting praise from every car magazine, it was "over-weight and over-budget" from what Ford wanted, so everybody that had anything to do with that program was "reassigned", from what I read.

 

The Gen II Camaro had its roots in Oz, with its "V" VIN number designation.  But the whole platform was Americanized greatly for use and sale in the USA markets.  That was how it came to be as quickly as it did.  When Lutz brought the Holden Monaro/Pontiac GTO to the USA, it was a lightly-adapted Oz car, imported, which kept costs down.  But the GTO distribution and dealer interaction with things like "allocations" was problematic and made customers mad.  The customers did not understand why the dealer they just put a deposit with would take months to get their car when a dealer 20 miles away had them "on the lot".  But, in reality, not untypical for "cash cow" vehicles.  BTAIM

 

GM's marketing people aimed at the younger customers.  But almost every new Camaro we sold exceed $50K MSRP.  Fathers bought their high school-age daughters full-loaded SS models for high school graduation.  A continuation of parents giving their kids many of the things THEY wanted back then, it seemed.  Mustang and Challenger built their sales volumes with V-6 cars and Camaro was not in that game, although it could have been.  To me, I understood the heritage of the interior design, but it didn't come off "right" to me.  I didn't care about the trendy option of "multi-color ambient lighting".  Marketing mis-cues abounded, with marketing focused on the more profitable SS big-engine models, from what I saw.  The old GM way or doing things . . . let others open market niches, then GM responds and becomes the sales leaders in those markets failed to work as it had in the past.  It seemed that everybody who knew anything left during the J. Smale years of "brand management".  Those that replaced them were not oriented toward automobiles, but "consumer goods", by observation.  Plus the "Why so many different brands that cost the same amount of money?" people, who didn't understand that customers who had $25K to spend were not all the same people, as some wanted sporty as others wanted utility and others wanted something nicer.

 

To me, Oldsmobile could have been made more successful by re-focusing on scrappy Chrysler LHS than on Lexus and Infinity, with the Intrigue (putting the Oldsmobile NAME on the front of the cars, rather than a new corp emblem nobody understood.  A corporate emblem for Oldsmobile that was a prediction of what was to come for the brand.  Rather than the Rocket taking off, it took off, circled the globe, then "off into space".

 

My observation about GM became . . . when a platform is designed correctly, hits the target market correctly and lots of sales happen, customers like the cars, once that platform is designed and signed-off on, that group is dismantled and they go their separate ways, rather than seeking to build upon their obvious successes with the next-gen platform.

 

When GM did the second generation of fwd C/H cars, they followed something that Chrysler did, by bringing in the suppliers and vendors into the design process "table" early on, to make final decisions on what the cars would cost to produce.  Making everybody a partner in the process, which worked well for Chrysler in getting the LH cars to market under-budget and in less time.  Less time due to engaged employees and engaged vendors and some innovative ways to do things to reduce production costs.  Thos particular GM cars were very well-received, had their trademark design cues and features, and they sold well with FEW warranty expenses as a result.  But their "next platform re-design" did not reflect those things, so it was back to "business as usual" for GM.  YUK!

 

Three books!  The John DeLorean book "On a Clear Day, You Can See General Motors", circa 1981, the Lee Iacocca book on his time at Ford and then Chrysler, and the Bob Lutz "GUTS!"  Between those three books, you can learn a massive amount about how things wree done in the 1950s - 1970s (at GM from the DeLorean book), how Ford (and others) operated in the middle 1950s and later, then the situation Iacocca found at Chrysler, then how Lutz re-shaped Chrysler from its traditional form to become the powerhouse it became in the 1990s.

 

There is a forth book, an Iacocca book it seems, which mentioned that after Chairman Lee had retired, he started to want to get back into the game at Chrysler, to run it again, using the assistance of Chrysler's largest stocholder, Kiri Kerkorian (who apparently bought massive amounts of Chrysler stock during the days of the first "bankruptcy" in the early 1980s, when wallpaper cost more than a share of Chrysler stock, to watch his investments grow to massive proportions in the 1990s, when the stock price doubled with each new product introduction.  That book mentions that Kerkorian was hosting a cocktail party to gain support for a Chairman Lee return to Chrysler, just that Bob Eaton got wind of it.  Bob (according to the book) flew to Las Vegas to crash the party and put an end to any thoughts of Iacocca returning to Chrysler.  He probably then devised "The Merger of Equals" to Daimler-Benz, given that he used to work for GM-Europe and probably knew some D-B operatives from interactions back then, the "sold" that idea to D-B, which set the stage for what to was come later.

 

The interesting part of the Iacocca book is its last chapter.  He makes the case that Chrysler will need a global partner for further growth and expansion past the USA.  At that time, he mentioned FIAT as the best partner due to their large European market network (not the "Fix it again, Tony" acronym).  At and prior to that. Chrysler had had European partners in Simca, Roots Group, and such, so the FIAT mention was curious to me, back then.  As things worked out, the FIAT involvement with Chrysler was one of the best things that could have happened after the disastrous Cerberus "involvement"!

 

As good of a "fit" as Cerberus was supposed to be for buying Chrysler out of its last bankruptcy, that entity knew more about "numbers" than "the car business".  Importing a lot of people who had previously worked for Lexus and Toyota to Chrysler to "rebuild an American Iconic brand", some people it later seemed that Toyota was glad for them to be somewhere else, it seemed.  Many "resume builders", too.  In reality, it seemed that they held Daimler in high regards for how they did business and the product decisions they made, moreso than might be expected, when that didn't appear to be the actual situation.  It seemed that many of the Daimer-related product decisions got poor results.  Taking the popular NEON and replacing it with "a lifestyle vehicle" names Caliber, for example.  Then taking their next-larger car, the Sebring sedan, and apparently orientating it toward people who would have bought a new 1953 Chrysler, back then, and wanted something like that again, but smaller, for their retirement years.

 

Like I mentioned, lots of mistakes were made by many in all of the OEMs back then.  Mistakes which the later generations failed to learn from, only to repeat the same or similar mistakes themselves, later on.

 

MANY things in those four books which could serve as business school Case Studies of how to do things and how NOT to do things, for best successes in the future.

 

Thanks for your time and consideration.  

 

Enjoy!

NTX5467

Edited November 16, 2023 by NTX5467 (see edit history)

[60FlatTop]

I usually look at the author of articles. This one, like many, appears to "pull features articles out of the air". Quite a few of the videos listed find negative features as their basis. Then there are videos featuring amazing/awesome features the author is unfamiliar with.

 

I figure it is a form of journalism intended to put bags of groceries on the table and little else.

 

To the topic, mistakes are not to learn from. In management meetings in any type of business historical references to how we got int a mess is quickly countered by a standing member who states "We are not here to dwell on the past. Our mission, today, is to move forward from this point." And the thoughtful minds silently respond "Ah, now I remember what you did".

 

At least Cadillac was brave enough to let Edith Piaf stand up for them.

[dr914]

I second that!  Horrible car not a riviera in my opinion

[NTX5467]

Yes, many of the "Biggest Flop" or "Worst Car Ever" items are revenue generators as people know that others will look at those articles, which generates "click cents" for each entry into that "journalistic" item.  For example, the Reatta might have been a sales disappointment, based on the numbers produced, BUT The Reatta Craft Center was a chance to test and perfect many new technology ideas (like the self-guided carts which moved each car from work station to work station, with no normal-as-we-know-it assembly line, which was more space efficient for smaller-volume vehicles).  It was also the first time a paint vendor had been on-site of the manufacturing facility, too.  LOTS of things that a higher-production vehicle facility had not been doing, as I recall.  The same facility was later used to build the Chevy SSR and some of the Pontiac G4 convertibles.  All niche vehicles for GM.

 

The "Worst Car" or "Cars to Stay Away From" articles are written by "someone" using "somebody else's" accumulated data.  Just working from "Information from Others" rather than anything even close to "first-hand knowledge" (as the authors were not alive back then, usually).  AND . . . who's to say that the data accumulated is anything close to accurate?  OR if it is even meaningful or as important to the long-term durability of the vehicle?  Kind of like what Consumers Report used to term "a defect" in a new car being that the headlights were not aligned correctly when it was sold new, rather than something which would generate a TSB from the OEM.

 

And then there are the "You're an Expert If You Know What More Than 30% of These Cars Are" type articles.  With multiple-choice answers many could wander through and be an expert, of pages loaded with ads.  Revenue generators and little else, which we support out of our curiosity.

 

But then I've heard people term cars "junk" or "gutless", which were far from that, when I looked at them and drove them.  Some people just don't know that a squeak or rattle does not constitute "junk".  Many just mean more attention was needed during assembly, which means a few minutes can usually cure them!  Nor that a peaky power curve engine does not mean "gutless" when teamed with a 2-speed automatic transmission.  Yet these "experts" claim to know everything. 

 

Oh well . . . 

 

Happy Holidays!

NTX5467 

[XframeFX]

1 hour ago, NTX5467 said:

I've heard people term cars "junk" or "gutless", which were far from that, when I looked at them and drove them.

We're talking mid 80s here. That 1987 Grand National I owned for 13 years was night and day. An absolutely wonderful powertrain for its time, a decent interior that was typical "chunky style" of the 80's but everything else was "Junk"!

A passenger commenting on my cracked windshield (one of many) and why I would take a Hot Car down a gravel road. "No" I said. Driving through a pothole at -25 deg. C, the chassis wanted to flex but the windshield said No. The windshield lost that battle. Up on the bumper jack, the doors would only close to the safety latch, even slamming, no way. Closing the driver's door, the front edge of the deck lid would pop-up. Severe Lacquer checking in later years, and visible ripples in the C-pillar from new. I specifically ordered a non T-Top car to avoid flexing of its body-on-frame design. AC output was lame too.

Maybe this had something to do with extended production? Logistics and follow-through during assembly was not well coordinated.

 

I regret letting go some of the rides in my past. I regret selling the Grand National only because my son wished I had kept it for him. He doesn't remember riding in it. Resale was good for 2001. It returned 50% of my purchase price after 13 years. However, if I were to sell that car today . . . !

[NTX5467]

On those cars, one way to see if the owner was not being truthful if he said "It's all stock" was to look at the top of the C-pillar, where it joined the top, top upper corner where it met the top at the top of the side window glass.  On those "stock" cars which had been raced, there would be "coach joint" cracks there starting in that right-angle corner going back about an inch toward the back glass.  BOTH sides.  Body flex "under torque".  Yet on one car, it's street racing heritage was obvious, from the owners denials and the way the engine looked.  As in K&N breathers on the valve covers.

 

Enjoy!

NTX5467

[60FlatTop]

In a similar vein to this topic I mentioned Edith Piaf. Although the CT6 is a great car the floundering it took to achieve it really cracked me up.

 

 

[NTX5467]

The viability of Oldsmobile was compromised by the earlier 1980s funding of the "new" Cadillacs and their NorthStar V-8.  Cadillac had made some flaky design moves which allowed Lincoln to take over the livery trade (i.e., limos) which Cadillac had always been strong in.  The NorthStar System of the new high-tech OHC engine and the electronic suspension resulted.  As Lexus also started stealing sales.  To me, the reality is that the wheels just know that power is turning them, not if that power comes from reliable and smooth OHV V-8s or OHC V-8s, but as Lexus was the newly-anointed luxury car "leader", and they had a OHC motor (which was the benchmark for the Ford 4.6L OHC V-8), then Cadillac had to have one too, to appear to be competitive rather than the also-ran GM had allowed it to become.  Which the Chev-a-ron did not help keep Cadillac in "elevated" status.  BUT that was the era when GM Marketing just seemed to be concerned if their vehicle specs and features looked good on paper, no matter if the GM equipment on the car, plus the vehicle itself, was poorly executed and built. 

 

A good example of that was the Olds Achieva.  When I first saw it at the Dallas New Car Show, I figured it would do decently well as it looked as bland as its competition from Honda and Toyota.  Only thing was that Honda and Toyota had nicer-operating engines, transmissions, and build quality.  When you looked at the  comparison chart in their sales literature, the larger engine in the Olds, the more gears in the transmission, .100" more room, all were noted "Advantage" for the Achieva.  Looked good on paper.  In the real world, the rougher-operating Olds 4-cyl did not match the Honda or Toyota for smoothness of fuel efficiency, things which mattered more than looks, by observation.

 

In the comparison tests of Seville/STS and DeVille/DTS models with European and Oriental competitors, the Cadillacs usually finished mid-pack.  In looking at the test results, much of the difference was due to "tire choice" and "suspension calibration" choices.  NEITHER of which would cost much to do differently, just some extra R&D time already funded.  Which gave the general public (including potential Cadillac buyers) the impression that that their competitors were better vehicles.

 

Then, in the mid-2000s, BMW suddenly sold more vehicles that Cadillac did, by 12K units.  Which came down to if each Cadillac dealer-of-record had sold just a few more cars/month, BMW would not have beat them!  This was in the times before the Escalade was the "force" it later came to be.

 

Through all of the flounderings of Cadillac, GM hired the guy who made Audi what it came to be, to do  the same with Cadillac.  One of the firest things he allegedly did was to tell the Cadillac dealers that "livery" would not be possible with upcoming Cadillacs.  Which basically handed that market to Ford/Lincoln in a really nice handbasket.  Then he wanted a smaller dealer body, making lots of smaller dealers (who also sold other GM brands in the countryside) mad.  Finally, they sent him on his way!  Another failed brand CEO that did more to hurt than help, by observation.

 

The CT6 has a LOT of high-level construction technology in it, none of which is inexpensive to do.  Such a car should have its own unique engine, but the base model had a normal GM 4-cyl turbo engine in it.  Upgrades?  A twin-turbo V-6 sized for Cadillac.  NO V-8s of any size.  Trying again to position Cadillac with high-tech, expensive engines and transmissions.  In platforms originally used by other GM lines, etc.

 

Can't forget the Eldorado Touring Coupe!  As Mercedes was using letters to designate their models, "research" indicated that Cadillac should do the same.  So the "Eldorado Touring Coupe" became the Cadillac ETC.  WTH?  As the Seville Touring Sedan became the STS and DeVille Touring Sedan became the DTS.  Another change which didn't help sales, if at all, by observation.

 

Through all of this, GM was trying to cement itself as a "tech leader" via voice commands controlling the radio and such, letting up to 12 WiFi devices be tethered to ONE vehicle, and other things many older (people who could afford to BUY a Cadillac) Cadillac customers, but allegedly were important to the younger potential customers.  And the grandkids might use, but 12?  BTAIM

 

In the 1990s, Cadillac had some show-stopper concept cars that should have been built.  Would have made everybody else, including Lexus, look 30 years old when they hit the showroom floors, but Cadillac did not.  Just as Buick should have done the Avenir and Avista concept cars, but did not.  As if all of that funding was wasted, so why spend it in the first place?  MORE missed opportunities to keep TWO platforms alive and making money (as the Avista could have been put on the Camaro platform and further refined to be worth of the Buick nameplates).

 

In some respects, as great as the CT6 is, it can tend to appear to be no more than a very expensive Chevrolet Impala.  Not worth of competing with BMW or "appliance car" Lexus.

 

When I went to the dealer training ried-drive event for the then-new Cadillac SRX "wagon", they had the popular Lexus competitor there.  I was standing in the staging area for the autocross event.  I looked over and there was one of the Lexus models there.  When the driver hit the gas to start the course, it just sounded WIMPY, compared to the others, as the SRX had a muscular tone to it and acted like it in acceleration and suspension dynamics.  We were also told to not set the parking brake on the Volvo as it would not release after the course, so if we wanted to drive it later, don't set the parking brake.  Of course, the GM products displayed their robustness in these areas.

 

By observation, GM does many things really well, but there is still far too much mediocrity in product and operations for it to get anywhere near its former glory.  The Smale Years dang near killed GM, although it was making money, on a market penetration of as low as 17%, compared to closer to 55% with ALL of its carlines doing good in the later 1970s and closer to 60% in the middle 1960s.  When the GM divisions were more-competing among themselves than with Ford, Chrysler, or others.

 

Just some recollections and observations,

NTX5467

[MCHinson]

I owned a number of 1979-1985 Rivieras as daily drivers. In 1986, I bought one of the new downsized Rivieras. While it was totally different from the earlier Rivieras, I loved it. I have always been a bit of a technology geek, so I really liked the 1986 Riviera with its Graphic Control Center. The technology was many years ahead of its time. Unfortunately, Buick had not really perfected the technology for the Graphic Control Center before the 1986 rollout. While the car was under warranty, Buick replaced the Graphic Control Center CRT 3 times. At the time I was told that the CRT was a $2000 part. As a young police officer, I could not afford to own the car out of warranty, so before the warranty ran out, I traded the car in on a Park Avenue Coupe. That was a nice car too, but I did enjoy the 1986 Riviera enough that I have bought a few similar ones over the years. The ones that I have found in the past couple of decades were both well worn 1989 models. I fixed both of them up a bit and sold them because they were just not in good enough condition for me to be happy with them long term. The later rear end sheet metal made the car look perhaps better than the 1986's vertical tail section, but I still sort of like the 1986/87 rear end styling too. Recently I have tried to find a 1986 Riviera in good condition, but they are very difficult to find these days. I have made a verbal deal to buy one with about 55,000 miles, that is not currently running, but the jury is still out on if the owner will be able to actually deliver the car as promised. Hopefully, one way or the other, I will own one again soon.     

[rocketraider]

8 hours ago, MCHinson said:

 Buick had not really perfected the technology for the Graphic Control Center before the 1986 rollout.

That was par for the course at GM in those years. 15 years earlier, maybe even 10, such technology wouldn't have gone out the door until it was proven long-term reliable to a fault. Especially on their upper-level cars.

[60FlatTop]

14 hours ago, NTX5467 said:

the SRX had a muscular tone to it and acted like it in acceleration and suspension dynamics.

That would be the discontinued Sigma platform, replaced by the Camaro version. I have a Sigma STS V8. I can't help but think of a hopped up '55 Chevy when I drive it. RWD, 280 cubic inch V8 320HP, similar wheelbase, even the battery is in the same location. The 4.6 engine got design changes for the RWD applications which resolved the major flaws but I wouldn't want to go into detail as a full understanding by the general public might increase prices if I want to buy another. If the big hit came the cost of an engine rebuild and bullet proofing costs about $3,000. In today's market I would do it in a minute.

 

To those corporate blunders usually made by highly credentialed managers I can relate my own experience as my business is pretty much closed due to the recent plague and my advancing age. I hired a couple of parachuted Xerox execs a while back. One suggested a well known business coach to help my operation which is quite intangible.  I met as planned and the expert was on the verge of insulting when he told me he "had no idea of how I was as successful as I had become". Well, that showed me he had some limitation. Maybe he was a better fit with GM or the like.

 

Edited November 17, 2023 by 60FlatTop (see edit history)

[NTX5467]

One thing from the Iacocca book mentioned that when Ford went looking for future execs, they went to recent Harvard business school graduates, in an apparent attempt to get the newest orientations and "remain fresh".  GM kept promoting from within, it seemed.  The GM way of doing that CAN perpetuate past fails with new ones, by observation.  The Ford way can result in inexperienced "theory" individuals who have not learned many lessons just yet.

 

How many times over the past few decades have you heard of Ford purging salaried employees of particular demographics?  At one time, the preferred Ford new-hire or promotee was a minority female about 35 years of age, allegedly.  It has also seemed that many of Ford's "big problems" tended to result from too many experienced people/mentors, the people younger employees can ask questions of and get credible answers from, were not there any more.  Their ignition module failures, when a new one which failed replaced the older one which never failed, happened, probably hurring vehicle sales of gasoline vehicles for several years in the 1980s.

 

Sometimes, I wonder about employees of one company that end up at another company and suggest the need for "coaching" by some perceived "guru"/"expert" to their new employer.  From what I have seen, not desiring to sound "generational", but most of these "coaches" are far too young to really know very much about the business they are consulting with or the various dynamics of what has made these businesses successful over the years.  Certainly, they can bring some new orientations to the table, but THOSE orientations are not universally-good-for-everybody, no matter how much they might believe they are.  While there might be some commonality in businesses and how they might operate, what would work well for one might well fail with another business, even in the same industry.  Not unlike car clubs!  How many of them are exactly the same as to what works to make them good organizations?  Everything MUST be fine tuned for each entity for best results.  The question of "Will it really work for US, might we modify it a bit for best results, or should we even consider it?" needs to be asked and pondered.

 

Back in the 1970s and 1980s, it became kind of popular for retired GM executives to buy a smaller-town dealership to retire with.  Afterall, they had worked for GM for decades and knew the car business.  Usually, after about three years, they had learned that while they might have known "the factory side", they did not know the "local distribution side" nearly so well, so the dealerships were put up for sale and full retirement happened.  One of GM's main strengths has always been its local dealer network, who knew how to balance "what the factory wanted", "what made things work at the local level", and could balance those two perspectives in a profitable manner.  Even now, there seem to be a good number of "self-proclaimed stars" on both sides of things, looking to line their pockets to their own benefit.  Especially in the local distribution side of things with allegedly big-time dealer groups.  Some might term themselves "turn-around specialists".

 

Just some thoughts and observations,

NTX5467

[NTX5467]

Back in about 2006, the Harvard Business magazine published an article on whether and employee should stay when the company ownership might change.  A reasonable subject considering the times.  As it evolved, it struck me as something more of a college research paper rather than a scholarly article as such.

 

To determine who stayed and who went, they used the company annual reports to determine this.  Not bad, all things considered.  Unfortunately, it seemed to not yield any concrete information other than a 50-50 split of "stay" or "go".  A few other dynamics did emerge, though.

 

The new manager/CEO would get "free reign" to make changes and such, before those changes were deemed good or otherwise.  Some managers would seem to barricade themselves in their office, only talking to their secretaries, as they poured over "data".  No "managing by walking around".  THEN, when an enterprising section manager might go up "to introduce themself", the new CEO kind of took the "He wants to meet ME" orientation, so that was a new friend which had insight into operations.  In that manager's department, it sounded like the words "brown nosing" were operative, in reality.  As the new CEO never seemed to wonder "If this person is up here talking to ME, what's going on in HIS department?"

 

In looking at resumes, it's easy to see where a manager has worked, at what jobs, and how long.  If the person has been a higher-level manager or CEO, with that first period of "free reign" and little oversight by the Board who hired them, his "new things" might seem good initially, even great, but by the end of three years, the other side of the "changes" would start to become obvious, sometimes "not good", SO that would motivate the new manager to find somewhere else to be, before things he orchestrated cratered.  So while things were still going well, he sought other employment before he might later be fired.  So he went to another company, where his achievements at the other company were lauded, so he was hired into a new company.  Cycle Repeat.

 

After a few cycles, many initial achievements allegedly happened, so he then becomes a top executive with "lots of experience".  "Experience" in knowing when to "get out soon", by observation.  With all of his "experience", he is lauded and comes to be sought out by many entities to help them run their companies.

 

My observation is that such "hired-in managers" only know how to manipulate "the books" to make themselves look good to the company financial operatives, which can increase the share price of the company's stock.  Of course, the easiest way to look profitable is to start hacking at costs.  Operational costs, supply costs, and employee costs.  Many times resulting in decreased customer satisfaction in the process.  Who might really care as long as the company is making money and paying dividends?  Need more profits?  Ease prices upward when such increases are not really warrantied, for example.  Of course, the old "supply and demand" orientation is operative as well.     And THESE things, over the past decades, has brought us to where we now are in USA businesses, by observation.

 

Certainly, many of these things have existed since the first businesses, but those earlier times were when "a good business person" was respected and appreciated, in a long-term orientation.  When "good teachings" happened with new managers and paying attention to what the customer wanted, then giving it to them, or exceeding the customer's expectations, was much more operative than in current times.  "Business" is about "making money", as always, but "business profits" should not seem to be about "greed", per se.  Finding that happy point on the continuum is the best way to do things.

 

Enjoy!

NTX5467

[60FlatTop]

Another way to look at the managerial side, the 1980s were about 100 years into the corporate phenomenon. Generalizing a 50 year working career for most people, that puts experienced managers of the time as ones who knew the early founders and leaders close enough to have shared their vision, but in the process of exiting. They had the opportunity to carry on that vision. Once attrition took them the "corporate entity" was in charge, a mindless thing lacking in vision. In the best instances The Corporation breeds mediocrity. It is a natural cycle that was the basis for a secondary degree I once worked on.

 

I am from Kodak town. George Eastman died in 1932. By 1960 all the plans were in place and approved to make an independent profit center and suburban manufacturing plant for the cameras he gave away to promote film sales. That plant lasted about 40 years until it closed.

 

Cycles of the man and the corporation.

[dship]

A few corporate managers have a vision that when carried out are successful and profitable.  Some just the opposite.  I worked for Honeywell Information Systems from the late sixties to the early eighties.  Corporate managers decided to compete with IBM's big mainframe computer business while most other computer companies like Prime, Digital, Wang were selling small/minicomputers.  In fact, Honeywell advertised itself as "The Other Computer Company" against IBM.  They failed and folded.  I also worked for State Street Boston from the early eighties 'til my retirement in 2003.  Their CEO, Bill Edgerly, took the bank from an end consumer retail/commercial loan bank to a "back shop" investment services institution.  It is now the second largest financial institution worldwide.  Now there's a man with a vision!   

Edited November 19, 2023 by dship (see edit history)

[60FlatTop]

Although there are a few exceptions, for the most part creativity is stifled by hedging the bet and never doing anything that hasn't proven successful somewhere else. I have seen that often.

 

Honeywell, the stuff I cut my teeth on. Back in '74 I operated a Honeywell 3000 Alpha Delta building management system that predated the use of a CRT interface. We had a slide carousel that indexed our graphic and back lit it to a view screen. Sometimes I wished I had it back, like toward the end of 1999.