Packard's Senior strategy pre-war

[Mahoning63]

I left Ford earlier this year and am in between jobs so had a chance to read the forum banter about our favorite marque. Was particularly interested in discussions on Packard's demise. As you can imagine, what I found was 10 years of the most animated and passionate expression of knowledge, experience, conviction and perspective that I have ever encountered! Someone should edit and publish it.

While at Ford I tried to push the planning department to innovate, with a perspective shaped by years of studying Packard, Pierce and the other independents as well as GM, Ford and Chrysler. The Dearborn mission was not entirely successful but I did get a chance to learn the business from the inside out and am now working with a few entrepreneurs on opportunities in the emerging electric vehicle market.

I know this is old ground but… just wanted to get some additional thoughts on Packard and would like to focus on pre-war. Where did the wheels come off, or at least start to get loose? I’ve seen your discussions on the 120 and 115 – most everyone seemed to agree with the strategy. With the Seniors, some felt they had gotten long in the tooth by decades end. Question: what type of Senior replacement should Packard have fielded? At what price? On what manufacturing line? When? I posted a few thoughts on the Packard Club’s forum recently ( http://www.packardclub.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=78 ) but would really like to hear your thoughts. You can greatly help the next generation reshape Detroit’s future by helping us understand its past. Thanks.

Paul

[Guest bkazmer]

I'm a little confused by the "Senior strategy pre-war" and "decade's end" combination, buut here's my $.02. The quality differential between a mid-price and a luxury car had narrowed, as a Packard exec pointed out. The overall luxury market shrank drastically. It is doubtful if any luxury car maker would have survived on luxury sales alone. Packard did the 120, Cadillac cheapened the LaSalle and had GM subsidy, Lincoln brought out the Zephyr, and Chrysler cheapened the Imperial into a Chrysler trim version. The rest disappeared. So I'd say Packard's strategy worked.

I think the 115/110 should have been a companion make. That's too big a market range for one brand.

Perhaps in contrast to some others, I don't think the 1940 Seniors were a disaster - they were much more modern cars than the 12, and could be profitable at lower volume. I do think that the differentiation in looks was insufficient - if you're fan of the pre-war Seniors you can spot the differences, but then you still check if it's Senior trim on a Junior, don't you? With overdrive, air conditioning, power windows and seats, and a strong engine, these were competitive designs. (But guys, what about that column shifter hang-up issue? I digress)

An automatic transmission was brought too late. It was the only new technology lacking, but a big advantage to Cadillac and Buick.

The Clipper was an elegant design, but the war robbed it of full market impact. If you don't think the Custom Clipper was a "real" luxury car, drive or sit in one. But again, hard to tell a Custom from a 6 for the man in the street.

The much maligned bathtubs were contemporary designs - the fuselage body styling was also done by Hudson, Nash, Mercury, Lincoln, Kaiser-Frazer and is more streamlined than GM's vestigial rear fenders. The reuse of the Clipper center section messed up the sedan proportions because the greenhouse is narrower than the body. At last Ultramatic. But by 1950 I think the car would appear stale - styling around too long, L-head in-line perceived as old tech (but any Caddy owner really want to run against a 356?). And in 1950 Cadillac finally outsold Packard.

[Mahoning63]

Ah ha, just figured out the confusion on the pre-war/decades end remark. Meant end of 30s decade, not 40s and the Seniors that I was referring to were the Sixteenth and V12 Seventeenth series. Sorry about that. Was focusing on 1935-42 because it seemed so pivotal to Packard’s fortunes. I agree with your pre-war comments.

The two biggest historical factors that jump out at me during that time were that (1) mass production was becoming a necessity in the luxury market and (2) styling/body configuration/proportions were becoming very important. Packard made the transition to mass production by 1940. I would argue it took them two years too long to get the Seniors transitioned but in the end, they did it and it was a tremendous accomplishment. The second factor, appearance, is where they seemed to lose traction. They certainly knew how to create the “luxury look” forward of the windshield. But if you look at the big transitions going on at the time, the 36 Cord with its lowness and lack of running boards, the 34 Airflow with its wide front seat, the 36 Zephyr with it good interior package and relatively low floor for a RWD platform, who had their ears to the tracks? Cadillac, not Packard. The 38 Sixty Special offered, in a conventional RWD body-on-frame architecture, lowness, wideness, 3-box proportions and a custom roofline. Exactly what Packard needed to field in 1938. When Darrin said Packard called him in the early 40s and was “so scared of GM they couldn’t see straight” he might have been prone to embellishment but his point was clear. Packard was, perhaps for the first time in their existence, behind the 8 ball and it wasn’t simply a superficial product oversight. They had a product design/strategy weakness. The Sixty Special gave Caddy an edge over Packard, a small one but a portent of things to come, and gave GM the confidence to proceed en mass with the 1940 C-body Torpedo sedans. I think those products were what Darrin was referring to. When I look at the struggles Packard had with proportions and styling in their post-war years, I can’t help but go back to that pre-war Achilles heel.

Edited October 27, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[Guest bkazmer]

Interesting point in looking aft of the windshield. The Packard practice there was pretty conservative until the Clipper. I think the 41 LeBaron Sport Sedan incorporates the ideas you speak of, but 4 model years later.

I'd say the 38 -40 Cadillac fenders carry sidemounts better than the 38-39 Packard. The Clipper (especially the Seniors with the longer hood) are well proportioned. The 41 conventional bodies were generally advertised with out running boards, sidemounts, chrome headlamp bezels, or stand-up hood ornaments, and with the two toning thought out in advance as far as cut lines. In other words "modern." Yet look at what versions sold, or at least what you see today (how much are we restorers distorting the history?)

For modern design, though, I think GM as usual gets too much credit. The Pierce Silver Arrow and the first Zephyr of the mid thirties are more streamlined looking than a 40 Packard or Cadillac.

[Rusty_OToole]

Packard's top brass in the 40s and 50s figured the profits were in the medium price cars and the senior stuff was a waste of time. In other words they handed the luxury car market to Cadillac on a silver platter.

In the early fifties they had the Patrician and the Caribbean. If they didn't appeal, you were pretty much forced to buy a Caddy.

Lincoln in those days was selling more in the Olds 98 and Buick class. Chrysler had the Imperial which most people did not think of as being in the Packard or Caddy class, fairly or not.

Most people thought of the Cadillac as the ultimate in luxury. If they thought of Packard it was as a has been. As for Lincoln and Chrysler, they were nice cars if you couldn't afford a Caddy.

[mrpushbutton]

Packard's board of directors placed a high value on paying dividends, at the expense of research and development of engineering advancements. GM had the low price-mid price market to help pay for these advances and took advantage of it. Nance tried to play catch-up, Monday morning quarterbacking tells us there were many misses in this effort, but he tried, and attempted to restore the prestige portion of the senior cars after years of middle priced offerings with L-head engines. A very good L-head engine, but the public had V-8 fever. The 1951 Packards, with the new body should also of had the V-8.

But alas, all of this MMQ-backing is in defiance of the fact that after 1937 the days of being a stand-alone auto manufacturer were only going to get tougher, and it was merge-combine or die. In looking at the various suitors that came a-courtin' at East Grand Boulevard it is safe to say that sitting out the mergers of the 1920s were the beginning of the end.

every company that was poised to survive had mated up by then, save Nash and Hudson, and their survival is itself an interesting study case.

[Guest 41_packard]

If you want to take the time, here is an essay explaining the '41-'47 Clipper development and how it fit into Packard's master plan....

Packard Motor Car Information - Packard Literature and Manuals - The 1941-47 Packard Clipper

[Mahoning63]

Fabulous points and the author of the Clipper article gave the Packard community a generous gift of new info and insights. Will argue an opposing view on Clipper and non-merged Packard.

Clipper

In mid-to-late 30s, Packard engineering and manufacturing pulled their end of the saw. (as an aside… if Christopher was using the cryptic “@#$ senor stuff” as shorthand for “outdated, diminishing volume, unprofitable product based on uncompetitive manufacturing process and holding Packard back from unleashing its full potential,” he was right. If, on the other hand, he was referring to them as such because he hated expensive cars and the people who bought them, then he was of a dangerous element within the company and Macauley should have flagged him way back when, kept him in the manufacturing box where he belonged, and black-listed him from running the company. Surely Macauley was well aware of the guy’s attitudes through their casual conversations on the golf course and in the club). It was product planning and body engineering/styling (whoever these people were) along with the leadership team, who tried to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. 1938 should have been Packard’s break-out year. That was the year they made the big investment in all steel bodies, the year the Sixty Special came out, two years after a couple other innovative competitors had made bold moves in 1936, and the right time to replace the Seniors with something modern. Instead the planners, imo, wasted time developing the 6-cylinder car in 1937 that may have brought in volume but hurt profits. In 1938, if Packard had followed their “one-two” product strategy of a decade earlier, they would have fielded a 282 eight and a 356 super eight, or perhaps a 282 V8 and 423 V12 based on the V8. The cars would have been low for the era (Darrin saw the potential at the time), wider, had a small driveline “hump” in the floor and a defined rear decklid. That’s what I think a class-leading Packard showroom would have looked like in 1938. That they finally came up with the car only after getting a one-two punch from GM, first with the Sixty Special, then with the 1940 C-bodies, speaks volumes about Packard’s product planning weaknesses. As it was, the 282 Clipper was late, reactionary, very nice but arguably not fully sorted out styling-wise, and had no step up in wheelbase, hood length or rear overhang to represent a class-leading Senior. The money Packard spent on a shorter hood and fastback coupe in 1942 could have gone towards that Senior sedan or at least a convertible. That was Gilman calling the shots, not Christopher. I don’t see how Packard could have waited to do the Clipper. There was no war as such to “wait out” in early 1940, only eroding market share for Packard that was getting worse by the month.

Viability of an un-merged Packard

I would argue that independence was, on balance, neither the better nor worse position to be in. Any good leadership team can make a small player viable in the auto industry and any poor team can sack a big player. Look at the DISADVANTAGES Cadillac had to live with. They existed within, and were hampered by, the bureaucracy of a big corporation and were dependent on larger elements that dictated key hardpoints of their bodies, suspensions and other elements, manufacturing processes and expected volumes. They were not necessarily as fast nor as nimble as a small player. And they couldn’t gamble as much because they had too much to lose. Packard, on the other hand, could pour on the technology, craftsmanship and styling and tout that they weren’t hamstrung, dragged down or otherwise compromised as Cadillac was. Back in May, 1952 Nance had all the ingredients for a car that could have usurped Cadillac. It was the Pan American. That car – that style – was every bit as good, every bit as carefully executed, as the Packard’s of 20 years earlier. It had the Packard “look” and panache. The big tall grill era was over for the time being. Had Nance ordered that car in 54 or 55 as a 6-pass coupe and convertible and a somewhat taller sedan on the longer wheelbase, with an optional SOHC V12 made in the old engine plant, and with a low cost V8 from a shrewdly negotiated joint venture with Mason rather than a capital-consuming $22M Packard-only V8 program that did nothing to topple Cadillac, the company could have had a shot at a 40-50K volume enterprise with high margins and profits. Or maybe… they could have merged with Hudson to get the step-down that the Pan American needed, the unibody, the medium priced derivative and a Jet-based sports car. I never understood Mason and Nance’s plan to merge everyone the way they envisioned, it’s almost as if they hadn’t planned anything beyond which of them would get to be on the cover of Time first. If Packard and Hudson were to be the top two players, clearly that meant platform sharing between them and it had to be done fast. Like, immediately. So why didn’t THEY merge? Nash had the bottom two slots covered and if Studebaker didn’t want to play ball with Mason, why not just let them go under and pick them up in a fire sale? Or forget them if Rambler took off?

Sorry for the long winded reply. Other thoughts?

Edited October 30, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[Guest 41_packard]

I TOTALLY agree that the Pan American was the direction they should have gone in the early 50's. The excitement it created should have been their clue to its potential success, but, except for styling the Caribbean, they ignored it. By the time they conceided they needed a V8, they were too far behind the rest of the industry and public perception was that Packard, in general, was outdated and behind the times. ANY mergers wouldn't change that. I do think, however, that had a merger with Nash gong through, and had the Packard line consentrated on a senior car based on the Pan-American you described, Packard-Nash would had a better chance of making it. We'll never know.....

[mrpushbutton]

The one point I was making, rather obtously, about Cadillac and its parent GM is that what Cadillac had through its ownership by GM was a constant source of MONEY. Cadillac LOST MONEY for GM throughout most of the 1930s, at one point the board of directors discussed discontinuing the brand due to the fact that "Packard has that market to themselves". They kept Cadillac as a flagship and a loss leader, offset by the sales of many Buicks and Chevrolets, Pontiac and Olds too, but mainly the big volume guys Buick and Chevy paid the bills.

This gamble paid off for GM when the war was over. Finally allowing Cadillac to be sold through GMAC to buyers "other than the traditional Cadillac customer" helped tremendiously too.

Packard as an independent was at the mercy of private banks and insurance companies when they needed money, in the 1950s. They got the money once, had trouble repaying those loans and when they ran out in '56 it was "sorry", "too bad".

This is where being part of a large combine would have helped Packard survive as a brand. Starting as late as the mid 1930s in the mid and low priced field, and having the reputation before as an expensive make that catered to the carriage trade did not set Packard up to survive in that mode no matter how hard George Christopher tried. Had Packard not merged with Studebaker the day still would have come when they could no longer afford to be a stand-alone auto maker. I think the early 60s would have been as long as they could have logically lasted, but with what as a product?

The switch in the late 30s that the industry took to all-steel bodies scripted this, as the fixed cost for making any auto body required heavy investment in costly tooling, tooling that is best offset by mass manufacturing as many parts from a given die/press as is possible. Packard was not poised to survive as a stand-alone from that one fact. They could have dug their heels in and made a Checker-esque product that just does not change, but against the constant styling evolution that GM was convincing the public they needed and wanted I predict that Packard would have seen very small numbers, and the same result--low sales, no source of money and then shut down.

[mrpushbutton]

I completely agree about letting Studebaker just wither and die. They made a decent product, good enough in many ways, but the business climate in South Bend was always difficult to impossible and the labor situation there was text book UAW-think. Nash could have made the lower priced mass-offering for the 1950s combine of independents. Mason was a sharp guy, it's too bad he died so early. Still, they would have needed massive amounts of cash to get up to speed , more than a public offering of the new conglomerate could have raised. One thing is certain: Goerge Romney made the merger of Nash and Hudson work, Jim Nance did not make the merger of Packard and Studebaker work.

S-P had two of everything, two executive departments, two engineering departments, sales, legal, marketing and so on. And they kept it that way until the money was gone.

[Guest AlK]

All of what you guys are saying is basically true, however there is another thought. Mason and Nance WERE going to merge. The first steps had already taken place. Mason merged Nash and Rambler and I think Hudson to form AMC. Nance merged S+P. The plan was to then merge both corps. to form a 5 brand corp. named AMC. This company would have had everything much like GM. They would have had the low end in Stude, Rambler, the middle ground of Nash Hudson, and Clipper, and tthen the luxury models of Packard. Then came the disaster quintuplets. Disaster #1 George Mason up and dies. He and Jim Nance were friends from the old Kelvinator days. That was how the whole merger plan came about to begin with. Disaster #2 George Rommney and his ego would not stand to be second fiddle to Jim Nance, so no major corporate merger. Disaster #3 the government pulls out it's military contracts from Packard and gives them to GM(pure politics). Disaster #4 the move to the Conner avenue plant which was not set up to handle cars larger than Studebaker, thus setting up the quality control problems that the 55's had early. Disaster #5 Packards lawyers must have slept thru their bar exams, because they did not pick up on Studebakers poor financial situation until it was too late to do anything about it. Most of the quality control problems were essentialy solved by the end of the model year, but by then it was to late. There are those that lay claim to Packards demise at the feet of the quality issue only and nothing else, but I say it cannot be as simple as that. Bad quality alone does not destroy a car company. If that were true GM would have gone under after the Corvair debacle, Ford would have exited after the Edsel, Chrysler was loaded with poor quality in the 70's as some of the cars rusted out between the end of the assemby line and the dealership, yet they kept going. This topic has been debated for years and I have no doubt that it will be debated for many years to come, much like debating the cause of the Civil War. Truth to tell, most likely there will NEVER be a final concensus of opinion. However it makes for good fireside chat in the middle of the winter when there is not much else to do.

[Guest Twunk Rack]

The name "Packard" was still so significant to the auto buying public, that when Packard announced "PACKARD IS BACK" for the 1955 model year, they couldn't build em & sell em fast enough. Well, for the first few months.

Then, word got out, that they were up to their old tricks, of shoving out the door poor quality vehicles. Whatever chance Packard had to survive, went out the window.

I find it fascinating that nobody wants to discuss how Packard's BUSINESS MODEL evolved thru the years. Well...some people apparently did. If you study how General Motors turned a once famous name for value for the dollar and quality, into an industry joke, you can see where they got their plan from.

Packard correctly recognized there was, in the 1930's, a decline in the demand for "super luxury" high performance cars. While it had always made money on its biggest, most powerful, most expensive models, it correctly decided to emphasize lower priced vehicles.

Who can deny that the famous Packard "120" and "110" series cars were a fantastic buy in their price range?

The public sure agreed, so that with the introduction of those great cars, Packard was well on its way to continue its tradition of being an industry leader for quality and value.

Trouble was, Packard's management evolved. The "old guard" who actually LIKED making automobiles, fell by the wayside, and we got folks like the executive who took one look at the plant where they made the big cars and said something about getting rid of that "G-D Senior Stuff".

So - that new "BUSINESS MODEL", which, many years later, was copied faithfully by General Motors and Chrysler, was simple...GRAB all the profits you can for executive salaries, perks, and quick dividends, screw the customers with poor build quality, and forget about performance.

Brilliant. Why, take, for example, the decision to tell customers complaining about the horrid lack of performance of the Ultramatic Drive, that they shouldnt WANT performance. No kidding, folks, that is what my dad was told when he refused to accept delivery of his '53 Patrician, when it was such a horrible "slug" compared to our '47 Custom.

Many of us have a distinct distaste for the political views and recent movies of Michael Moore. But how many of you have seen his first big movie "ROGER & ME", when he uncovered the shameful practices of GM, pointing out how it was bent on corporate suicide.

Bottom line - I think there is a fantastic story to be told, about the rise and fall of American industry, by studying how Packard became a world-wide word for quality and value, dominating the expensive car field, and then committed suicide, by forgetting the principles that enabled it, and our country.

Germany's Damiler Benz and Japan's Honda & Toyota came out of the 2nd World War with production difficulties far more severe than Packard. They re-discovered the old Packard business model - meaning, sell the customer VALUE for whatever price range they elected to compete with ( you want to tell Damiler Benz or Cadillac that there was no market for high-end cars after the War ?).

Edited October 30, 2009 by Twunk Rack (see edit history)

[Mahoning63]

Totally agree with Mrpushbutton about Cadillac being on the dole in the 30s. Sometimes it takes getting kicked around for a few years or decades to wake up, soul search and decide you want to live. Perhaps Cadillac decided by the mid-30s that enough was enough. When you hand the design responsibilities for a radical new body style, to be marketed in your top-of-the-line and most conservative division of all places, to a untested 24 year old designer, you know you’ve thrown caution to the wind and gone “all in”. Similarly, a few years of steady beatings by the competition finally caused Gilman to order up the Clipper. What is it about the American auto industry that exists the constant threat of “degenerative product disorder”? Or is it degenerative leadership disorder? With two of today’s Big 3 in or just out of bankruptcy and the third solvent only because they mortgaged the house to get a $25B line of credit in 2007, you have to wonder.

The wealthy end of the American buying public has always had an appetite for high-priced transportation. Look at the ascendency of Mercedes. Or BMW, Audi or Lexus. In reviewing American product over the last 110 years, there was really only one period where the high end stuff wasn’t available in any great quantity or of such design that it appealed to Americans: the late 40s to late 60s. That was an aberration and it only existed because no OEM made available the product (Rolls was too expensive and out of touch). People are people, they don't change much. A V12 Pan American, a V8 Hudson or maybe a straight six compact Hudson with Euro influences might have sold enough to rebuild the small auto empire that once was Packard. Torsion suspension, unibody, step-down, a good automatic, high quality interiors, lasting designs with no fins, wrap around windshields, wide body/narrow tracks or any of the other has-been gimmicks, and no need for constant styling changes because it was done right the first time. Nance had one last window of opportunity in 1952-53 to get it right. He should have hired Arbib as chief designer and asked Henney to make one-offs of the entire proposed line-up, including Hudsons based on a cleaned-up Italia theme. Then he should have invited the bankers to come in for an exclusive preview and told them: “This is where your money will go, boys. Any takers?" But Nance, like so many others then and now, preferred to follow the wind dial rather than a compass.

Edited October 30, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[Mahoning63]

Twunk Rack makes a great point. There must never be even the slightest whiff of quality deterioration.

My only quibble is with the 115. Look at the nice profits in 1935 and 36. Then look at the diminished profits in 37 on twice the volume. Word on the street 10 years ago was that M-B's original compact, the 190, lost money in the first and second generation but the company was "hoping" to turn a profit with the third gen. High end OEMs must take care in planning what to sell. Give away 115's, cannibolize higher margin 120 sales. Give away 120s, rob from the 160s.

Only one thing can be said about Nance trying to make a Clipper brand out of thin air. It showed how little he knew about people, brands and product.

[Guest Twunk Rack]

Back in its "glory" days, Packard had an advertisement explaining the word REPUTATION. How cruel a master REPUTATION is. Once you get it, it is an incredible sales tool

All that talk about styling decisions, merger decisions, wont change the fact that TOYOTA, HONDA, MERCEDES BENZ, BMW all kept selling the SAME styling year after year after year, and made money, BECAUSE PEOPLE KNEW THEY WERE GETTING VALUE FOR THEIR DOLLARS!

I understand the people with the later post-war Packard products love their cars. But no matter how much you WANT to believe in those cars, the fact is, towards the end, Packard couldnt give em away. Lack of styling, bad merger strategy, all these things wont cover up the simple fact that once you destroy a good reputation by year after year of poor build quality and poor reliability, it is OVER.

Chrysler SHOULD have been out of business thirty years ago. I forgot now how many times they had to be bailed out BEFORE the turn of the century.

It wasnt easy to turn the once hallowed name of General Motors into a industry joke. Same for Packard.

Here's a challenge for anyone who STILL wants to believe that STYLING or corporate organization issues will save a company. I DARE you. Next time you are at an auto show, crawl under the nose of a '53 or '53 Packard, and compare how ITS bumpers and front end are re-enforced, and then crawl under a '53 or '53 General Motors car and see how much better built they are. See if you can get the owner to open the hood, and see how much more rigid the GM product hoods were. Now take em out on the road, and watch & feel the difference in structural feel - the solid feel of the GM product, and the way the Packard hoods "flutter" on anything but smooth roads.

When you are done with that, compare the POWERS RELIABILITY REPORTS of General Motors and Chrysler cars in the 90's,. with HONDA & TOYOTA.

Then try and tell me that styling and corporate organization were relevant to what killed famous American manufacturers.

Edited October 30, 2009 by Twunk Rack (see edit history)

[Mahoning63]

AIK - great recap of the 5 disasters. Ok, let's assume Nance muddled through and somehow Packard lived to see the 1957/58 Predictor-based product and the rest of AMC merged, combined and fleshed out. They would have basically been a Big 4th and no different than the others in terms of product. It is hard for me to see success in that strategy. There would have been over capacity within the large car segment by the early 60s and consequent losses by all the OEMs. The weakest, and possibly the youngest, would have struggled the most. And where would Packard be long-term? Would it have met the same fate as Cadillac? Where was the innovation and unique value proposition in Nance's plan? Or in today's Big 3? I have to give Romney credit. He saw an opportunity with Rambler and ran with it.

[Mahoning63]

Twunk Rack - no argument about the importance of quality. But one thing my seasoned boss told me when I first started at Ford was that hot product covers up a lot of sins. In the late 50s styling carried Chrysler Corp. despite quality issues. The 55 Packard's styling was good but not "gotta have". That said, from the past threads I read (perhaps some were yours) Packard had unusually high warrently claims, which could be crippling.

[Guest Twunk Rack]

. . . . . hot product covers up a lot of sins.

I AGREE - FOR A WHILE. AND PACKARD DID HAVE A 'HOT PRODUCT' WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE '55. THEY PROVED HOW 'HOT' IT WAS IN AN INCREDIBLE SPEED TEST OF 25,000 MILES @ OVER 100 MPH. THE PUBLIC ATE IT UP, AND STARTED BUYING PACKARDS LIKE CRAZY.

BUT AS I NOTED EARLIER, THE HORRID BUILD QUALITY AND DISGRACEFUL LACK OF RELIABILITY THAT CAME OUT OF THE FACTORY KILLED THOSE FIRST FEW MONTH'S SALES, AND FINISHED OFF WHAT REPTUATION PACKARD HAD LEFT.

In the late 50s styling carried Chrysler Corp. despite quality issues. FOR A WHILE. BUT WHEN CHRYSLER QUALITY GOT WORSE, THE COMPANY GOT INTO TROUBLE, AND EVENTUALLY FOLDED, EXCEPT FOR LARGE INFUSIONS OF LOANS.

The 55 Packard's styling was good but not "gotta have". That said, from the past threads I read (perhaps some were yours) Packard had unusually high warrently claims, which could be crippling. NOPE....NOT 'COULD BE'...CRIPPLING..IT WAS CRIPPLING . KILLED SALES DEAD!

( Waiting for someone..ANYONE to take me up on my "dare" suggested earlier....meaning...crawl under a '53 - '54 Packard, and then crawl under a '53 or '54 GM car, and compare how fragile the Packard is compared to a Buick, Olds, or Cadillac of the same year. Then open the hoods and compare structural rigidity......! Have I any takers ?

[Mahoning63]

No qualms about the quality lapse doing Packard in. I think what others have said about the contributing disasters is valid also. Look at it this way: Packard went into 1955 having already used up 8 of its 9 lives. It's like GM and Chrysler going into this recession. Both were hanging in there before the oil spike and mortgage fiasco despite having made major business and product mistakes but when the recession came, they were the weakest and fell first. Just like the Depression shaking out those on the edge. Had Packard gone into 1955 with defense contracts in tact, no Studebaker, and some working capital left, and THEN they botched their quality (and maybe had a few years of questionable quality leading up to 55 and a slush box) they still might have weathered the storm. 1956 sales would have been around what, 25000? Heads would have rolled, fingers pointed, quality improved - you know, the usual OEM scramble - just like Gilman hustling to get the Clipper out. Maybe some good press on the quality and reliability of the 57s, new bodies for 58 and voila, back to "weak but alive". GM had actually made a lot of progress with quality recently and was SLOWLY digging out when the recession came. Meanwhile, Toyota was struggling a bit with quality and some ill-conceived product but their huge war chest cushioned them nicely during the last year. It takes a lot to topple a healthy car company and sometimes just a nudge to knock over a weak one.

Edited October 31, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[1935Packard]

I agree with others that the real problem was the post-war strategy, not the pre-war strategy.

I have a 1935 Twelve and a 1941 110, and the thing about them is that they are both great cars. They are both marvelously designed, are technically advanced, and are just beautiful. So long as Packard was making beautiful and technically advanced cars, they were going to do as well as the market would support.

Edited October 31, 2009 by 1935Packard (see edit history)

[Guest Twunk Rack]

. . . . . . . So long as Packard was making beautiful and technically advanced cars, they were going to do as well as the market would support . . .. .

= = = = = = = =

I disagree. The '55 Packard was both attractive, and certainly technically advanced.

Example, if you work at it thru GOOGLE, you will eventually come up with a fantastic "promo" made by Packard and shown to the public in late '54, showing how marvelous the then-new torsion bar suspension is.

To summarize that "promo", it shows a '55 Packard, a Chrysler, and a Cadillac each "taking" the same rail-road crossing raised section of road-way at speed.

You can guess the rest - the Packard literally "sails" over the bump smoothly, while the other cars, with conventional suspension, are just about out-of-control.

The combination of Packard's flood of advertising in late '54 claiming that Packard was back, together with the fantastic feats of performance these advanced cars were capable of (hi speed endurance runs, the superb roadability, etc) sold Packards like crazy. For the first few months of '55 model year production. Then, as so many of us have noted, once the terrible reputation of these cars in service got out, sales fell off to practically nothing.

Sad fact is, the '56 production run saw SOME but not ALL of the "poor build quality" issues resolved. But it was too late. Again, the old story about screwing around with that cruel word "reputation".

But again, LOUSY BUILD QUALITY killed Packard. And it was the greed of the so called "Harvard Business School" mentality, of trying to "milk" maximum profits from a corporation, with no regard for the product itself, that caused LOUSY BUILD QUALITY.

But let's not single out Packard's management in the final years for this - the REAL question for America TODAY is, why did Chrysler and GM work so hard to copy that bad business model too ?

Edited October 31, 2009 by Twunk Rack (see edit history)

[Mahoning63]

I like Packard35’s secret to Packard’s success. And am glad Twunk Rack brought the discussion back to today… why else would we want to put ourselves once again through the post mortem?

Having just lived the OEM grind for 9 years I can tell you none of the top folks consciously set out to ruin companies, nor do I believe Nance or Christopher did. The top 50 people at the big 3 are, by and large, the high IQ types, self motivated, driven, clear headed and speak very articulately. But they also love listening to themselves, are arrogant, controlling, power hungry, need to be the smartest person in the room and have difficulty getting along with others. Most of us found these traits almost comical, and none are probably detrimental to a car company’s fortunes. What is detrimental, and what I observed repeatedly, is that these people were too numerical and not particularly innovative or creative, they too often wore horse blinders, and some of the MBAs thought they could fix any situation in any industry, anytime, anywhere by virtue of their education, intelligence and “specialness”. So different from Alvan Macauley, who was a car guy first. He loved them, had a good grasp of the entire business and was respectful of each employee. He was not threatened but rather felt comfortable surrounding himself with talent and was an excellent strategist who laid out careful, realistic, inspired plans and took his time achieving them the right way. IMO there’s nobody in the business today quite like him with the possible exception of Marcionne (Fiat/Chrysler). The leadership at Renault/Nissan, Honda, BMW, VW/Audi and Peugeot are also a cut above the rest. A lot of changes are coming to the auto industry in the next 5-10 years, it will be interesting to see who learned the lessons of yesteryear.

Edited October 31, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[Rusty_OToole]

Many good points made. Would like to point out that from 1956 on the climate for high priced and upper medium priced cars was horrible. Many dealers were hurting badly due to a sales slump in 56, then came a recession in 57 and 58 and car sales died, especially the more expensive cars which had been popular in the early 50s. Olds,Buick, DeSoto, Nash, Hudson Lincoln Edsel and Mercury were hard hit in those years. Olds Buick and Mercury survived, Packard DeSoto Nash Hudson Edsel and the Lincoln Continental Mark II didn't.

In 58 the only cars to show gains in sales were the Rambler and Thunderbird. AMC was now calling all their cars Rambler including the larger models that used to be called Nash and Hudson, and the Tbird was not only all new, it was the first one with a rear seat and naturally outsold the old 2 seater.

Next came the compact car fad of the early 60s, followed by the youth market and explosion of performance cars and sporty cars like Mustang and GTO.

What I am driving at is this. Even if Packard had survived 1956 they would have been in for some mighty tough years, along with the rest of the upper medium priced and high priced makes. It is doubtful they could have survived no matter what they did.

Edited November 6, 2009 by Rusty_OToole (see edit history)

[mrpushbutton]

Exactly, Rusty, thank you. Which is why Cadillac, Lincoln and (to some extent) Imperial would not have survived that period were they not part of a multi-bracket comglomerate. As I stated earler, and still firmly believe, in order to make it to the present, or at least the present before the NY money boys runied it, the multi-bracket conglomerate with a healthy low-price, high-volume line was the only kind of domestic to survive. It took a lot of Fairlanes to pay the way for a Lincoln. When they sold a Lincoln they made a nice profit, but there were quarters when the market didn't feel like buying many new Lincolns. Base-line and up Fords kept rolling and selling and covered the fixed costs.

Edited November 3, 2009 by mrpushbutton (see edit history)

[Mahoning63]

In the 1920s particularly, Packard built its empire selling high priced cars that performed better, looked better, lasted longer and were of better value than the competition. Jump ahead 30 years to the luxury market of the mid-50s though early-60s. For me, a couple things stand out. First, Mercedes slowly began building their U.S. empire during this time with an expensive car completely different than Cadillac. Second, although the market fell out for medium and medium-high priced cars as Rusty and John mentioned, Caddy sales held up fairly well. And third, Cadillacs were not perfect.

Look at all the things that held Cadillac back because they depended on platform sharing, parts sharing and volume production. And look at what happened when they actually tried to make a better car in the 57 Eldorado Brougham. It was wonderful but at $13,000 was a poor value and only served to show that Cadillac was incapable of breaking out of the GM box. The Continental Mk II was a more successful attempt but still came up short on the value proposition. Packard, on the other hand, was founded on engineering and manufacturing such cars at a competitive price and in higher volumes. Similar to how they handled the Merlin engine.

I won't argue the merits of having a lower-priced model to help stabilize revenue, and mentioned earlier that Hudson might have been the best partner. But I would argue that Packard could have gone it alone too. Beginning in 1955, what was needed was a modern Packard that was noticably better than Cadillac in style, performance and quality and at a price not too much higher than Cadillac. A lot has been said about the disadvantages of the Independents because, for example, the price of advertising for the big players was spread over more units, but the fact is that none of this has much consequence if you are competing in the high price / high profit margin segment. Nobody ever groused that Packard’s wonderful advertising of the 20s and 30s was a financial burden. Nor should tooling costs have been an undue hardship had Packard created a lasting "5 year" design. For me, one intriguing question is: did Nance and Teague’s 57-58 have the right stuff? Would folks today drool over it like they do a 1934 Twelve? The Predictor, Black Bess and clay design themes and renderings lead me to believe it was not quite enough although on a promising design track, particularly with the hidden headlights. I ordered a back issue of Collective Automobile magazine today to learn a little more about Packard’s plans for 57-58, hopefully the content will be helpful. Also ordered the issue covering a theoretical 2010 Packard. Mustn’t rule out the brand coming back some day.

Edited November 6, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[mrpushbutton]

I don't buy Packard lasting as a stand-alone, had they not taken on the Steadybreaker dead weight. Let's reexamine the mindset of the 1950s car buyer in America: There was an overwhelming trust in the future and security of the big three, and a feeling that anyone else was going to go under "and you won't be able to get parts or service", especially after K-F faded into the sunset after besting Chevrolet in 1948. The nation decided, for a while, that all they wanted was GM, Ford and Chrysler, that one weird family on the block bought Ramblers, but that was it.

Packard's reliance on private banks and insurance companies for operating capitol was a huge problem in that day, and the reliance the dealer network had on the local bank for financing options (advantage: GM) put them in a permenant "also ran" status.

GM had new bodies and chassis in 1957, '58 and '59, again in '61. This would have been during Packard's

"5 year plan" , and I think Dick would have been pulling magic out of a hat for no $$$ again, reskinning the '57 in an attempt to keep up.

You mention "Beginning in 1955" -- Packard spent a lot of money on a new beginning in 1955, with all of the money they borrowed they could not afford a new body shell (see my comments above re: the high fixed costs of all-steel body construction and how it shaped who survived and who didn't) The belt line on the '55 Packards was still stuck in 1951, a huge difference when Harley Earl started dropping belt lines in '53 and the public LIKED that difference. Had Packard not rushed the development of the 1955 models and had they not been plagued with the design and production problems they might have stood a chance of eeking out an existance as a Checker-esque company that made an unchanging product.

But overwhelmingly, the money was with the big three.

[Rusty_OToole]

Chrysler launched Imperial as a separate make in 55 and even though they had a few good years at first, never made much headway. 10000 to 20000 units a year was about it in the late 50s and 60s. Eventually in the 70s they turned it back into a Chrysler, because Chrysler's top brass got sick of seeing their flagship car at the bottom of the sales lists month after month, at least so I heard.

Lincoln did not do much better. Only Cadillac seemed to keep up sales of 50000 to 100000 a year. This was as much due to their inspired advertising and market positioning, that made the Cadillac the ultimate prestige car to practically everyone. They rode on this reputation for years.

But the point is, the luxury car market was a lot more limited than people realize, and Cadillac had a hammerlock on the market.

Packard handed the #1 position to Cadillac on a silver plate in the 40s and never really had a chance to get it back.

[Steve_Mack_CT]

Interesting topic that actually began with the AQ salute to Packard very shortly after it's demise and continues today. More on this in the PAC forum as well.

I think the closest American post war vehicle comparable to a Senior Packard would have to be the Continental Mark II. Largely handbuilt, somewhat understated, this vehicle was not aimed at the Cadillac/Imperial/Lincoln or Packard buyer but went upmarket. That buyer may have been considering RR, Bentley or Mercedes and, as Rusty points out there was not enough market for a car like that. Certainly not such a conservative design.

So Continental failed even with corporate subsidy and the understanding it would not be a huge profit center for FOMOCO. No way could Packard, already somewhat lagging due to a lack of economies of scale, build a competitive "senior car". They may have been able to compete with the upper main stream luxury cars of the 50s with just a little more build quality but when you say "senior strategy" again as Rusty points out the market for a truly unique (car that would have been coach built a few yars earlier) car was more limited by then. Partly because most cars could perform daily duties much better than just a few years ago.

If you look at luxury cars today, every make except RR & Bentley has an "entry line". I am not sure how good RR is doing after splitting - I recently heard Bentley sales are strong, they kept the "old factory but got the intangible, Crewe workforce, many of whom are third generation craftspeople. Let's just say they have been at it so long, they are an exception. Today, however, people are so far removed from the days of old that the concept of handbuilt is not revered. (forget the fact that some "handbilt neo classics are out there - they are generally glorified kit cars using a mainstream base) None of those lines would survive on their top models alone.

One other comment on this thread, going back to prewar, styling is always subjective but I do not think 1940 was a lagging year for Packard at all. In fact, it is generally considered a more desirable year by collectors throughout the line. Is that due to "Packard Maystique" or styling that is at the very least equal to the contemporary competition? I think it is every bit as good as GM's best (which was nice then also..) Just my two cents while in the thread.

Edited November 6, 2009 by Steve_Mack_CT (see edit history)

[mrpushbutton]

Rusty, There are people I know who were at Chrysler during the 50s and 60s, they claim that the company never made money on the Imperial. Shame, they were very good luxury cars of that era, especially the 1963-'68 models. Again, going back to my "conglomerate survival" theme beyond the 1950s the Imperial used an engine that could also be found in a Dodge truck, just as the engine used in a Lincoln could also be found in a Ford truck. Cadillac stood alone in the big three in designing and building a seperate engine for only its luxury make.

[Mahoning63]

Engineering innovations aside, the Independents' product by the mid-50s didn’t pass muster, by vote of the public. Too quirky, boring or underpowered. I have to wonder if the public mindset about Independents was shaped by that reality and if a successful Independent could have altered that perception. Rambler proved it was possible with small cars. There is no evidence that Packard could not have done the same with luxury cars.

Agreed that Packard had no chance by 1956 but do not believe it was a lost cause when Nance took over in May of 1952. In my opinion he simply made the wrong product call for 55, then compounded his mistake by mismanaging its development and production. He could have ordered the Pan American as a 54 or early 55 model with an efficient, lively SOHC V12 made in the old engine plant. Maybe a V8 version later. Instead he spent $23M on an OHV V8 that he admittedly saw nothing special in, and the rest of Packard's money on a compromised body design. I chuckled when I read how he and his “key men” generated reams of data charts slicing and dicing the market a thousand different ways, then took forever to make up their minds about what to do, then came up short when they finally did. Many of us witnessed the same thing happen within the halls of Detroit over the last decade. There is no nice way to sugar coat this: union issues, government policies and market forces notwithstanding, yesterday’s Packard and today’s Big 3 were run into ground by people who didn’t have a clue, a plan or a dream on Day 1 of what to do. Certainly nothing compelling or workable.

On the need for merger, Nance could have circled back to Romney once both companies had gotten their acts together in the late 50s. Better to do it when both were strong anyway. But a luxury producer, if they are doing it right, doesn’t worry about short downturns in the economy because like their customers, they don’t live paycheck to paycheck. They build a war chest that gets them through the tough times. Packard could have stabilized financially by 1957.

Cadillac volumes never dipped below 125,000 after 1954 so the luxury market was indeed still alive. Could Packard have skimmed 30,000 high margin sales? Possibly, with the right product. There was a huge price gap between a 55 Cadillac and a 55 Continental Mk II ($4000 vs $10,000). Packard's opportunity was to make Continental Mk II quality for $5000. I don’t think they should have gone back to coachbuilding the way Rolls Royce continued or the way the 30s Seniors had been produced, no business case for that.

Imperial benefitted from Exner and Engle... and suffered from Exner, Engle and inconsistant quality. Nor did it have the historical cache Packard had. Lincoln finally did come into its own by 1966 and really took off in the early 70s. Mercedes also took off during that time. They both proved it could be done. Success for Packard would have been unique. Not Rolls. Not Cadillac. Not Lincoln or Imperial. More like Mercedes but with an American luxury flavor.

Just an opinion... with many holes in logic!

Edited November 6, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[Rusty_OToole]

Interesting that you mention Rambler. Like Cadillac they benefited from excellent marketing and advertising from 1949 until the early 60s. That is why they succeeded when the Henry J, Jet, and even Plymouth didn't. Does anyone remember the compact 1953 and 54 Plymouth? It sold so badly it was even beaten by Buick, at the same time Rambler was setting new sales records.

Cadillac had 2 unique selling strategies. One was advertising meant, not to sell cars, but to convince Cadillac owners they were special. The Cadillac owners then sold the cars. Does anyone remember the Cadillac ads that featured a big picture of jewellry from Harry Winston and a smaller picture of a Cadillac, with no selling copy at all? This softest of soft sells obviously worked.

The other flash of genius was to keep the Cadillac in short supply. Of course right after the war all cars were in short supply but Cadillac made a practice of producing a few less cars than they could sell. This made Cadillacs seem like the most desirable car on the market, and at the same time guaranteed Cadillac owners an excellent trade in. In the end, it allowed Cadillac to sell more cars than its 2 closest competitors combined.

I'm not sure I like this sort of games. But have to admit they work, and paid off for Cadillac.

[mrpushbutton]

One thing that happens in "buying patterns" in the USA is that the American consumer likes buy from "a winner" and is very reluctant to buy from a manufacturer who is against the ropes. This may well be a world-wide phenomenon. This thiking worked magnificently for Cadillac after the war. Any business owner worth his salt WANTED TO BE SEEN in his Cadillac. That car said to the others in his community that he is successful at what he does, and caused other people to desire that vehicle, from the top down.

The reverse of this situation is what must have played out around countless water coolers during that time period, say 1953, a dialogue that might have gone something like this:

"hey Bill, what did you do this weekend?"

"we went shopping for a new car"

"Oh yeah, what are you looking at"

"We went down to Smith Studebaker (or any other orphan) and were looking at a..."

"what do you want to buy that for, they aren't going to be around much longer, you won't be able to get parts, service"

"well, what should I be buying?"

"Get a Buick (Dodge, Mercury), that's a much better car, I really like mine, anything but a Studebaker (Packard)

I have heard the same discussion in recent times, this time it's biting Cadillac, somewhat less since the improvements to that brand/line by Bob Lutz, but the buyers are going for Lexus and Mercedes over Cadillac and the water cooler talk is the same.

The scary thing is, no amount of advertising can turn that influence around. MBAs hate that.

[Steve_Mack_CT]

Mr. Push - Not so sure it is biting Cadillac anymore, GM may be far from perfect, but Lutz got it right. The line up is very exciting, very American (true to form, the lastest Acura products are an attempt to knock off on the new lines that are distinctly Cadillac - so you know they got it right.) and a bright spot for GM. J.D. Powers likes the quality through the line up and in the latest "supercar stand off" the new CTS V literally humiliated the top dog BMW on the curves as well as stopping and off the line. (had to chime in here - 10 guesses what my daily driver is...well it is not a "V" but I think of my CTS as a modern day Packard 120)

All that said, I do agree with your watercooler logic. I bought the caddy for a certain mystique, and a leaning towards American cars. We recently got us one of them German cars too - and my wife prefers that one. They are both great cars but very different personalities. I would not really class the Audi as a modern day Packard as it is really more of a sport sedan than a luxury car, and very european in flavor. I kind of liked 63's analogy of the modern Packard ideally being Mercedes like but American. BTW - I am not sure I see a big quality gap if any, I think it has been that way for a while but I think that is still taking time to sink in at the water cooler...

[Mahoning63]

Excellent, the water cooler conversation makes the point pretty darn clearly.

OK… let’s pretend Nance had rolled out the Pan Am V12 in 1955, to the sheer joy of every worker in the company. Maybe the Country Club conversation might have gone something like:

“Hey Theodore, how did your big investment in that blue chip work out?”

“Fabulous John, my partners and I made a very nice profit. Am celebrating by trading in the Cadillac 62. Mary doesn’t know yet, it’s a surprise.”

“She’s a classy lady. You going to upgrade to the Sixty Special? She’s worth it!”

“No, with this deal our ship finally came in and it’s time to treat her to something really special. Geez, the gal means everything to me. Yesterday I ordered a new Packard V12. Have you seen them? Incredible.”

“Only a glimpse. The president of our bank bought one recently. Not the kind of car you see everyday. Where’s the nearest dealer? Any out here?”

“No, it’s an old dealership downtown. Nice place, reminds of the Club. Am taking Mary to dinner at Le Chateu’s on Friday. It’s two blocks from the dealership.”

“That’s the best restaurant in town.”

“You bet. The gentlemen at Packard have arranged to surprise her by delivering the car in front of the restaurant. It was their suggestion. I’ll give her the keys at the table and when we walk out… well… I can’t wait to see the look on her face!”

“Trust me, she won’t be the only one gazing. Promise you’ll take me for a ride soon, I’ll be in the market this summer and I have to admit, haven’t been excited about a car like that since before the war. Remember Dr. Wilson’s Packard Twelve Victoria?”

“Honestly, I had forgotten… until I visited the dealership last week. They have some nice artwork of the old cars on the wall. When I saw the pictures, then saw that beautiful new V12 on the showroom floor, it all came back to me. Oh yeah, this is going to be the most exciting night we've had in years!”

Edited November 7, 2009 by Mahoning63 (see edit history)

[mrpushbutton]

Steve, I acknowledged the vast improvement in the Cadillac line, ergo my comment about "improvements to that line by Bob Lutz", Cadillac has come a long way. Not to make this thread turn off course, but in looking at GM's line up in the past few years it seems as though much attention has been paid to Chevrolet and Cadillac, Saturn is just sort of there in looks and in marketing and I think their sales reflect that. Buick has a nice look right now, I'm not seeing any marketing to back that, but then again, they are a guest of the US Gub-ment for the time being.

I think GM needs to rethink their strategy to get buyers back, the 60 day buy-back does not address the problem: cars (from GM, a lot from the last 25 years) that $300,$400, $600, $1,200 repair bill you to death after the warrenty expires.

Guarantee that for as long as you own that car no repair will cost over $100 and you have my undivided attention. This is what loyal buyers of foreign brands cite most when discussing why they won't help out and buy an American car--they get a little old, go off warranty and things start breaking and they cost you a lot of money to get fixed and my import doesn't do that.

Much like the Bell Telephone Company learned in the late 1930s when as a monopoly, they had to fix your telephone when it broke. They figured out quickly that if they built a little more quality and robustness when they made the phones they would not be out repairing them. The big 3 want the squeeze every fraction of a fraction of a cent out of every part hoping to hit it out of the park with profits (for executive bonuses) and that always comes back and bites them. They shave fractions of a cent out of parts, the engineers and vendors are saying "I don't know about that"--"I wouldn't make it that way" , the part fails, there is a recall, it's on the 5,6, and 11:00 news and the brand and company has lost face again.

Steve, I like the new Cadillac, want one, and acknowledge that it is a world-class car. I don't like Mercedes-Benz, we have a lot of people around here who drive them, I just have never warmed up to them. I understand them to be great cars mechanically, but they just aren't for me.

Edited November 7, 2009 by mrpushbutton (see edit history)

[Guest Twunk Rack]

Can't help being amazed at how desperate some of you guys are to avoid the simple truth. The simple truth is that the Packard product failed in the marketplace because the cars were no longer equal to the competition. Their "build quality in the 1950's eventually got SO bad you couldn't give em away.

The new car buying public isn't stupid. They buy, by reputation. Packard executives, as did General Motors and Chrysler executives years later, got greedy, didn't give a damn about the product, and milked out funds that should have been used for building quality products.

I see NO ONE has the GUTS to take up my "dare" - which is to crawl under a -53 or '54 Packard's front end, and compare the cheap way it is braced, with the way General Motors Buicks, Olds, and Cads were. Then get in the respective cars, and compare performance.

All the fancy excuses some of you guys like wont hold water, because you dont want to face the fact that when Packard announced it was "back" with high performance quality cars, sales shot thru the roof. For the first few months of '55 production, Packard was selling cars like crazy. Packard COULD have "made it". Packard DID "make it" for those first few months of the '55 model year, but worked too hard to destroy what was left of its reputation. It is that simple.

Are some of you guys related to the "death wish' types that ran Packard, and then later General Motors and Chrysler, into the ground ?

You get a reputation for giving the customer value, and the product sells. Even if the product is not technically or visually exciting. Toyota and Honda make the same product year after year after year. And they keep making money (incidentally, check the parts content - those cars are designed, part sourced, and built by AMERICANS !).

Yes, I understand that you guys who own the later post-war Packards want badly to believe in your cars. We car buffs know how to make em run right. So of course once they are worked on by car buffs like us, they can be made to be o.k. cars (that is, if you dont try and compare them side-by-side with the competition !).

The typical new car buyer isn't interested in being a do-it-yourselfer.

Many MANY years ago, I happened to run across the actual salesman who delivered my pre-war Packard as a new car. He clearly remembers what they had to do to get the cars ready for delivery. Take the hub-caps out of the wrappers, put in the cig. lighters, wash em, vacuum the interior, and gas em up (shipping regs. required them to be out of gas). Packard sold QUALITY & "value for the dollar" in those years, no matter what price range you bought into. Of course a Packard "120" isnt "as good" as a Packard V12. Any more so than an Oldsmobile isnt "as good" as a Cadillac. So what ?

When you get a reputation for providing VALUE for the dollar, you get to survive as a manufacturer. Screw the public, and you wont sell cars. It is that simple.

Compare how Packard built cars before WW II, to that to the disgusting situation in the 1950's. Told this story many times before - when I sat on the curb at Beverly Hills Packard, eating my lunch with some service guys, listening to the Service Manager cursing a blue streak - as a tractor-trailer car transporter pulled up from the freight yards. Loaded up with then new Packards " OH GAWD...HERE COME ANOTHER BUNCH OF DO-IT-YOURSELF kits....!

Edited November 7, 2009 by Twunk Rack (see edit history)

[Rusty_OToole]

You make a good point on quality. Chrysler introduced the 5 year 50000 mile warranty to get over the bad reputation they earned in the late 50s and it worked. Many people went back to Chrysler who swore they would never buy another one, and others bought Chrysler products for the first time. It paid off because it was not a gimmick, their cars really were reliable. As late as the mid 70s sales of the Dart and Valiant carried Chrysler, even though the cars themselves were tinny, noisy and out of date. People loved them because they were so economical, reliable and long lived. At times they accounted for 80% of Chrysler's sales. The engineers and executives couldn't figure out what people saw in them.

[mrpushbutton]

You make a good point on quality. Chrysler introduced the 5 year 50000 mile warranty to get over the bad reputation they earned in the late 50s and it worked. Many people went back to Chrysler who swore they would never buy another one, and others bought Chrysler products for the first time. It paid off because it was not a gimmick, their cars really were reliable. As late as the mid 70s sales of the Dart and Valiant carried Chrysler, even though the cars themselves were tinny, noisy and out of date. People loved them because they were so economical, reliable and long lived. At times they accounted for 80% of Chrysler's sales. The engineers and executives couldn't figure out what people saw in them.

Rusty--those Darts ad Valiants of the 70s (I liked to call them "bar of soap cars" because they looked like what we carved as kids when the project was to carve a car out of a bar of soap) would run forever, you could not kill their powertrain. Here in Michigan, especially in the Detroit area the thing that finally took those cars off the road was when the unibody frame-box rusted out where the torsion bars mounted, then the car took a mean lean in one corner and it was "game over". Detroit sits on top of one of the world's largest salt mines and they use the stuff liberally.

But lord, you could not kill them.

[mrpushbutton]

Pete-- I don't disagree with you in what you espouse re: 50s Packards vs GM. I think a '49-'56 Oldsmobile is a damn hard car to beat, the Rocket V-8 matched to the Hydramatic, a Fisher body, that's it. I have driven a few of these cars, worked on them and they are truly great cars. The same can be said of Cadillacs of that era. I'm not a big Dynaflow fan, although I like Buicks as a rule for their styling audacity.

Still, I don't harbor illusions about my '56 Packard. I know its short comings. Yes, we find our way around them. It is still a very decent car, and a worthwhile piece of the Packard story. My particular car, being a Packard company car and belonging to the Comptroller, and its very late production date make it historically significant to me as a student of Packard.

When I bought it I wanted (and still want) a 1932-1934 big eight sedan or coupe. Would I like a Dietrich 12 convertible coupe? of course, but since I haven't bought tickets lately I figure I'm not going to win the lotto. I think in about 15 years I will be able to get that pre-war closed car, after the CCCA implodes from its membership all dying at once and the supply far outstrips demand.